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Abstract
While considerable attention is devoted to legal scholarship, little has been
written on the process by which academic writing on law evolves. This paper departs
from the existing pattern and examines five potential trajectories for legal scholarship.
One is based on the idea that knowledge “accumulates” as part of “progress” towards
a better understanding of the matters under study. The second is the concept of the
“paradigm”, derived from work done on the history and sociology of science. The
third focuses on the idea that academic endeavor concerning law yields useful ideas
since market forces are at work. The fourth is a “cyclical” thesis, based on the
assumption that themes legal scholars write about arise on a reoccurring basis.
Finally, legal scholarship can potentially be characterized in terms of fads and
fashions.
It appears that scholarly trends in law develop in a manner that is at least
partially consistent with each of the five potential trajectories identified. At the same
time, none captures fully the dynamics at work and indeed there is some conflict
between the various paths available. The paper tests these conjectures by focusing on
a particular topic, namely corporate law. The survey offered does not identify one of
the five potential trajectories as being dominant. Still, each does help to explain how
corporate law scholarship has developed. Correspondingly, for those who are
interested in why some ideas prosper whereas other claims “burn out”, this paper
offers a “test-driven” analytical framework that can be applied to discern how
academic writing on law evolves over time.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Legal academics, despite facing inevitable teaching and administrative
pressures, spend a considerable portion of their career reading, discussing and
producing legal scholarship.1 In so doing, most will develop a sense of why certain
ideas spread and prosper whereas as other claims “burn out” or fail to capture
attention in the first place. Still, while academic lawyers may make assumptions
about the trajectory of legal scholarship, their understanding of the topic will almost
certainly be intuitive only. This is because, despite the attention devoted to scholarly
activity, there is little literature on the process by which academic writing on law
evolves. In other words, there is “no jurisprudence of legal scholarship”.2
A 2001 article by law professor Cass Sunstein illustrates the lack of attention
devoted to the trajectory of academic literature on law. He argues in this paper that in
law ideas spread via academic “fads” rather than by virtue of being “good”. In so
doing, he discusses only briefly why legal scholarship might evolve differently than in
the manner he suggests.3 In so doing, perhaps he was assuming that alternative
theories were so well-known that articulation would be superfluous. In fact, however,
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John Gava, Scholarship and Community, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 443, 443 (1994).

2

George P. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 970
(1981). The situation has not changed recently: Deborah L. Rhode, Legal
Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (2002).
3

Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1251, 1253-54 (2001). He only included his discussion of the topic at the
suggestion of several commentators on an earlier draft (at 1253, n. 5). Sunstein in fact
was critiquing the notion that there is a “market” for legal scholarship, discussed infra
notes xx to xx and accompanying text.
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a search for a fully developed analysis of the trajectory of legal scholarship will
probably be in vain.4
This paper departs from the existing pattern and examines various possible
ways in which academic work concerning law evolves. Such an exercise might be
thought by some to constitute introverted navel-gazing. The volume of legal
scholarship is, however, mushrooming and there indeed is a growing literature on the
genre.5 Given all of this intellectual endeavor, it is appropriate to pause and seek to
discern the trajectory of legal scholarship.
No one is truly competent to evaluate properly the overall state of legal
scholarship.6 Correspondingly, this paper will not seek to determine in a definitive
way the manner in which academic writing on law evolves. Instead, it is more of a
thought experiment, with the central objective being to provide a platform for further
analysis. Part II of the paper begins the exercise by identifying five potential
trajectories for legal scholarship.

4

The most thorough treatment of which the author is aware is David Kennedy,
When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 335
(2000), though the purpose of this article was to discuss international law rather than
legal scholarship generally.
5

On the volume of legal scholarship, see Peter Birks, The Academic and the
Practitioner, 18 LEGAL STUD. 397, 398 (1998); Reinhard Zimmermann, Law Reviews:
A Foray Through a Strange World, 47 EMORY L.J. 659, 692-93 (1998); Darla L.
Daniel, Of Deckchairs, Icebergs and Gestalt Shifts: Unger, Kahn, and a Student of
Contemporary Legal Thought, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 851, 852 (2001). On the
literature on legal scholarship, see Mary B. Beazley and Linda H. Edwards, The
Process and the Product: A Bibliography of Scholarship About Legal Scholarship, 49
MERCER L. REV. 741 (1998).
6

David P. Bryden, Scholarship about Scholarship, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 641,
641 (1992).
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The first of the five trajectories Part II discusses is based on the idea that
knowledge “accumulates” as part of “progress” towards an improved understanding
of the matters under study. The second is the concept of the “paradigm”, derived
from work done on the history and sociology of science. The third focuses on the idea
that academic endeavor concerning law yields a “better” product over time since
market forces are at work. The fourth is a “cyclical” thesis, grounded in the
assumption that much legal scholarship revisits on a reoccurring basis themes
previously explored. The fifth candidate is Sunstein’s thesis that scholarly trends in
law can be characterized in terms of fads and fashions. Part II concludes by offering a
tentative hypothesis, this being that each of the five trajectories identified potentially
influences academic writing on law to some degree. At the same time, none captures
fully the dynamics at work and indeed there is some conflict between the various
paths available.
In order to test the conjectures offered in part II, Part III of the paper
undertakes a case study of a particular field, namely corporate law. The case study
begins with an overview of theoretical corporate law scholarship, offered from
historical and cross-border perspectives. Part III then assesses whether scientific
methodology has had a substantial influence on how the relevant literature has
evolved. After this, insights derived from the history and sociology of science will be
relied upon to offer a précis of corporate law scholarship, together with a matching
critique. This will be followed by an assessment whether a marketplace for ideas has
helped to foster “better” academic writing on corporate law. Next, there will be
discussion of whether a strong cyclical dimension is present. Part III concludes with
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an examination of the extent to which corporate law scholarship has evolved in
accordance with Sunstein’s account of fads and fashions.
Part IV offers a conclusion. One theme is that the corporate law case study set
out in Part III lends support to the hypothesis developed in part II, namely that various
dynamics – some in at least partial conflict – influence the path of legal scholarship.
Another point made is that the test case was a fair one. Corporate law was chosen as
the subject matter for a pragmatic reason: it is the author’s chosen area of research.
Still, as part IV will discuss, the attributes of this particular field conform sufficiently
to the norm in legal scholarship to ensure that the case study was appropriate. Finally,
it is acknowledged that the pluralist verdict this paper offers concerning potential
trajectories will not be a fully satisfying one for those seeking definitive answers.7
Still, the point is made that some type of hedging appears inevitable (and prudent)
since there is, as of yet, “no jurisprudence of legal scholarship”.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify a threshold issue, which is to
define what qualifies as legal scholarship.8 Its precise boundaries are uncertain.9 For

7

For a criticism of “congenial pluralism”, see JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG,
TWENTIETH CENTURY TORT THEORY, 85-86 (Vanderbilt University Law School Law
& Economics Working Paper 02-15, 2002), forthcoming GEO. L.J., (2003).
8

There is a tendency to assume that everyone knows what is meant by
scholarship in general and legal scholarship in particular: David Feldman, The Nature
of Legal Scholarship, 52 MOD. L. REV. 498, 498 (1989).
9

Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and
Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926, 935 (1990); Edward L. Rubin, Legal Scholarship, in
A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 562, 562 (Dennis
Patterson ed., 1996). Legal dictionaries provide little assistance. Perhaps the most
helpful guidance is offered by the BUTTERWORTHS AUSTRALIAN LEGAL DICTIONARY
681 (Peter E. Nygh and Peter Butt, eds., 1997) (saying legal theory refers “to any
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our purposes, though, it should be sufficient to say that legal scholarship constitutes
the body of learning, and especially the academic research available, in the field of
law.10 Under this definition, jurisprudence, which is concerned with questions
regarding the nature of law, its general structure, its sources and so on, clearly
qualifies. Theoretical legal scholarship – which implies the use of intellectual
disciplines external to law to carry out research on its economic, social or political
implications – does as well.11 This is also the case with academic writing on law that
has an explicit policy objective, such as promoting law reform. Finally, “doctrinal” or
“descriptive” publications, where the author seeks to organize and categorize legal
rules (“doctrine”) in a systematic fashion, can be categorized as legal scholarship.12
While the “internal” focus of legal research of this nature means that it cannot be

academic analysis of the law which requires a degree of abstraction from the
principles stated in case and statute-based law”).
10

Cf. Ronald Benton Brown, A Cure for Scholarship Schizophrenia: A
Manifesto for Sane Productivity and Productive Sanity, 13 NOVA L. REV. 39, 39
(1988).
An alternative formulation would be “the body of work produced by university
professors who teach in programs that prepare their students for careers in law”:
Rubin, Legal Scholarship, supra note xx, at 562. This, however, is probably too
narrow because the definition excludes publications by judges and lawyers. See
Philip C. Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REV. 221, 22223 (1988); cf. Feldman, Nature, supra note xx, at 509. On the extent to which
academic work done on law by academics in disciplines other than law qualifies as
legal scholarship, see Rubin, Legal Scholarship, supra note xx, 562-63; Edward L.
Rubin, Law And and the Methodology of Law, [1997] WIS. L. REV. 521, 522-23.
11

On this definition of theoretical legal scholarship and how it relates to writing
about jurisprudence, see Brian R. Cheffins, Using Theory to Study Law: A Company
Law Perspective, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 197, 198 (1998).
12

Rubin, Legal, supra note xx, at 564-66; Richard A. Posner, The Present
Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1113-16 (1981). On various subcategories of doctrinal scholarship, see Kissam, supra note xx, at 230-35.
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readily classified as legal theory,13 doctrinal writing undoubtedly constitutes a core
element of the research available in the field of law.14
II.
A.

LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP TRAJECTORIES: AN OVERVIEW

The “Cumulative” Model: “Progress” Towards “Truth”
“Progress” is a complex notion.15 For instance, even among those who have

explicitly acknowledged its past influence on society, there is some doubt about the
agent of change (e.g. human initiative vs. cosmic intervention) and about whether
there will be similar momentum in the future.16 Still, to the extent progress occurs, its
general direction is clear: betterment and improvement.17 Moreover, it is fair to say
that the concept implies the steady accumulation of knowledge over time.18

13

Rubin, Legal, supra note xx, at 564-66.

14

Cheffins, Using Theory, supra note xx at 197; Michael Chesterman and David
Weisbrot, Legal Scholarship in Australia, 50 MOD. L. REV. 709, 722-24 (1987);
Richard Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1317, 1320
(2002).
15

Indeed, at least one author of a book on the subject has refrained from offering
a definition: MARGARITA MATHIPOULOS, HISTORY AND PROGRESS – IN SEARCH OF
THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN MIND 5 (1989) (saying that to “attempt to arrive at a
conclusive definition of progress would be as presumptuous as trying to prove or
disprove the existence of supernatural powers”).
16

On these questions, see CHARLES VAN DOREN, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 5-6,
13-15, 23, 31-32, 261-63 (1967).

17

VAN DOREN, supra note xx, at 6; JOHN BAGNELL BURY, THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS: AN INQUIRY INTO ITS ORIGIN AND GROWTH 2, 5 (1924).
18

VAN DOREN, supra note xx, at 324, 333; ROBERT NISBET, HISTORY OF THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS 5 (1980); Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright
Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. J. 3, 13-14 (2001). Still, there are some who contend
that cumulativity may not be an essential element of progress. See, for example,
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Drawing these themes together, a first potential trajectory for legal scholarship
is “cumulative” in nature, with the presumption being that academics will be making
headway in addressing issues considered important. To elaborate, legal scholars,
being mindful of existing controversies, build upon the work of their predecessors.
Over time, outstanding issues are resolved and new insights are derived from those
resolutions.19 Sustained intellectual enquiry can thus be expected to yield a “better”
understanding of the topics under examination.
Natural science is the intellectual endeavor where the sort of accumulation of
knowledge just described is thought of as taking place in its purest form.20 The
classic conception of scientific understanding is that it improves as part of an
unfolding story as prior knowledge is used as the foundation to improve our
comprehension of the world.21 Scientists, under this view, “progress” towards the
“truth” by relying on “scientific method”, which constitutes objective enquiry founded
on the safeguards of explicit theory-building, replication and corroboration.22

LARRY LAUDAN, BEYOND POSITIVISM AND RELATIVISM: THEORY, METHOD AND
EVIDENCE 22-23 (1996).
19

Rubin, “Law And”, supra note xx, at 526; Carl N. Edwards, In Search of Legal
Scholarship: Strategies for the Integration of Science into the Practice of Law, 8 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 21 (1998).
20

Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV.
763, 766 (1986).
21

Marcello Pera, In Praise of Cumulative Progress, in CHANGES AND PROGRESS
267, 267 (Joseph C. Pitt ed., 1985); Jan Beyea and Daniel
Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers: The Need for Reform
of Expert Review Procedures, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 330-31 (2001).

IN MODERN SCIENCE

22

Edwards, supra note xx, at 24; Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An
Essay on Law and Scientific Method, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 266-72 (1989). See
also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993), where
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Does legal scholarship “progress” in a manner akin to that attributed to
scientific knowledge? The possibility it does merits exploration since various
attempts have been made to characterize the analysis of law in scientific terms.
Perhaps the most ambitious effort to depict the legal system as a body of
scientifically-deducible principles was pioneered by Christopher Columbus Langdell,
Dean of Harvard Law School in the late 19th century.23 For Langdell and his
disciples, law constituted an objective system defined by concrete, recurrent
principles set down in decided cases. Scientific enquiry proceeded by extracting rules
from judicial rulings and law “progressed” when a jurist or scholar discovered a
previously unarticulated principle that made sense of a body of case law. The rise of
the academic treatise, where authors sought to rationalize and rethink entire areas of
doctrine, was a significant by-product of this sort of legal science.24
By the 1920s, the scientific approach to law advocated by Langdell was
becoming unfashionable since American legal academics were rebelling against what
was felt to be an unduly stale and technocratic conception of the legal system.25
Ironically, those academics who turned the tide against Langdell’s intellectual project
Justice Blackman observed that “(s)cience…is a process for proposing and refining
theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and
refinement….”
23

On Langdell’s version of legal science, see Levit, supra note xx, at 275-77;
NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 14-24 (1995); ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FALLING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 170-75
(1993).
24

Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the “Middle Ground”, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 2075, 2079-80 (1993); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 490 (2002).

9

were themselves favorably disposed towards judicious use of scientific methodology.
Langdell’s critics did not believe that law could be reduced to a set of internally
consistent principles by the careful study of cases. Many, however, were “legal
realists” who were optimistic that the proper application of the methods of social
science, particularly empirical analysis, could yield reveal “the reality” of law.26 The
most potent contemporary variant of this line of reasoning comes from the field of law
and economics.27 One argument those who advocate the use of economic analysis to
study law have made is that their brand of scholarship facilitates the accumulation of
knowledge in a scientific fashion since empirically disprovable hypotheses are being
produced and tested.28
The scientific conception of law has had enduring appeal in other respects.29
In continental Europe, a strong belief that law is a system rather than merely a
practical tool for structuring relations and solving conflicts underpins to this day a

25

DUXBURY, PATTERNS, supra note xx at, 24-25, 36-37, 79; John Veilleux, The
Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1977-78 (1987).

26

KRONMAN, supra note xx, 195-201; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY
209-11 (1992); Brian Leiter, Is There an “American” Jurisprudence?, 17 OXFORD J.
OF LEGAL ST. 367, 377-78 (1997).
27

KRONMAN, supra note xx, 225-32, 240.

28

Posner, Present, supra note xx, at 1121-22; Jason Scott Johnston, Law,
Economics, and Post-Realist Explanation, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1217, 1231-32
(1990); Jonathan R. Macey, Law and the Social Sciences, 21 HARV J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 171, 172-73 (1997).
29

Posner, Present, supra note xx, at 1120-21; Darla L. Daniel, Of Deckchairs,
Icebergs and Gestalt Shifts: Unger, Kahn, and a Student of Contemporary Legal
Thought, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 851, 866-67 (2001).
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strong faith in the idea of legal science.30 Also, despite the doubts cast upon
Langdell’s approach to law, Anglo-American observers still sometimes make the case
that the quality of legal scholarship and judicial decision-making would improve if
academics and judges adopted scientific techniques and principles on a consistent and
conscientious basis.31 Moreover, supported by pleas for more empirical legal
scholarship, the production of research which uses statistical data to test defined
hypotheses is on the rise.32 This latter trend has, in turn, led some to proclaim that the
study of law is becoming more science-like.33
Still, while the notion that our understanding of law can be improved via the
proper application of scientific method has had enduring appeal, the extent to which
academic learning concerning law accumulates in a manner akin to scientific
knowledge should be kept in perspective. One caveat involves the cross-border
communication of ideas. With the physical and natural sciences, theory-building and
theory-testing can occur through the medium of a transnational scholarly

30

FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN, supra note xx, at 501; Franz Werro, Notes on the
Purpose and Aims of Comparative Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (2001). Note,
though, that equating the continental version of legal science with natural science is
not entirely appropriate: Fletcher, supra note xx, at 988-89.
31

See, for example, Veilleux, supra note xx; Peter Ziegler, A General Theory of
Law as a Paradigm for Legal Research, 51 MOD. L. REV. 569 (1988); Peter A. Alces,
Contract Reconceived, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 39, 95-97 (2001).
32

Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship:
Judicial Decision Making and the New Empricism, [2002] U. ILL. REV. 819, 821,
824-26, 831.
33

Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work,
and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, [2002] U. ILL. REV. 875, 909-10, 91216.
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community.34 This is because the subject matter of research (e.g. the prediction of
earthquakes) conducted in a particular country will typically be understood by
researchers everywhere and investigations which are conducted can generally be
evaluated by experts around the world. Matters are different with law, since legal
scholars tend to write only about their own legal system and only for those acting
within that system.35 Moreover, there are no globally accepted theories concerning
the role of law and the functioning of the legal system, so even legal scholarship that
is explicitly cross-border in orientation will necessarily have an audience that is to
some degree jurisdictionally specific.36
Another important distinction between science and legal studies is that the
method of enquiry typically differs.37 Scientists consciously seek to assimilate, verify
and expand upon the work of others in the field. In contrast, testing established
theoretical constructs is not necessarily a core feature of legal scholarship. Instead, it
has a reactive quality, in the sense that the purpose often is to address timely issues
arising on an ad hoc basis (e.g. a recent case or statutory enactment).

34

Id. at 894-95.

35

Id., 895.

36

Id.

37

Edwards, supra note xx, at 21-22; Rubin, Law And, supra note xx, at 550;
Terence Daintith, Legal Research and Legal Value, 52 MOD. L. REV. 352, 357
(1989); Todd D. Rakoff, Introduction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1278, 1285-86 (2002).
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Also important is that academic lawyers may have an explicitly normative
inclination that is largely absent from the sciences.38 Scientists are not simply
disinterested searchers for the truth but rather are individuals engaged in a human
activity which can have an underlying social or political agenda.39 Nevertheless, the
discourse of scientists is couched in value-free terms; good work within a particular
field is that which accounts for observable phenomena. In contrast, legal scholarship
quite often akin is akin to advocacy, with the author critiquing court decisions or
legislative policies with objective of putting the law at the service of an admired
cause.40 As Edward Rubin, a US law professor, has said about law:
“The entire field crackles with normativity, and it is this characteristic that
renders the scientific concept of validity so unhelpful as a basis for
evaluation.”41
Or as John Kramer, another law professor, has frankly admitted with respect to his
own scholarship:

38

Edwards, supra note xx, at 23-26; Rubin, Law And, supra note xx, at 524-28,
542; Michael J. Graetz and Charles H. Whitbread, Monrad Paulsen and the Idea of a
University Law School, 67 VA. L. REV. 445, 455 (1981).
39

Tom Wilkie, Science is for Everyone, Whatever They Try to Tell You,
INDEPENDENT, March 25, 1995, at 15.
40

FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN, supra note xx, at 501; Roger C. Cramton,
Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 6-8 (1986); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
The Scholar as Advocate, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 391, 394 (1993); Graham Brown, Should
Law Professors Practice What They Teach?, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 316, 335 (2001).
41

Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal
Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 904 (1992).
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“I did not pursue truth wherever it might lead. I pursued more food stamps,
less hunger (and) the end of the impoundment of funds for the Women,
Infants, and Children feeding program”.42
To the extent that this attitude is prevalent generally among legal academics, it is
unrealistic to expect legal scholarship to display the general pattern of cumulative
knowledge so commonly associated with science.43
What about law and economics scholarship, with its scientific pretensions?
Even here, it cannot be taken for granted that the academic literature meets the strict
standards of verification and reliability associated with science. Doubts exist about
whether economics itself is a discipline where scientific methodology is properly
invoked and knowledge accumulates. In particular, economists stand accused of
accepting and applying too readily the contestable assumption that economic behavior
is the consequence of rational choices governed by self-interest.44 Correspondingly,
claims that law and economics advances our understanding of legal topics in a
scientific manner must remain at best controversial.45

42

John R. Kramer, Comment on Rebecca Eisenberg’s “The Scholar as
Advocate”, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 401, 404 (1993).
43

Rubin, Law And, supra note xx, at 540-41.

44

JOHN PHEBY, METHODOLOGY AND ECONOMICS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
32-36 (1988); Daniel M. Hausman, Kuhn, Lakatos and the Character of Economics,
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY 195, 208-10 (Roger E. Backhouse
ed., 1994); Gregory S. Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics
Movement: Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231, 232-33, 237-42 (1991).
45

For examples of those who have cast doubt on the scientific credentials of law
and economics, see Levit, supra note xx, at 282-85; Mark Cooney, Why is Economic
Analysis So Appealing to Law Professors?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2211, 2230 (1993);
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B.

Paradigm Shifts: Kuhn and Legal Scholarship
While the application of scientific methodology may well not be a hallmark of

legal scholarship, even if it was, characterizing the evolution of academic writing on
law in cumulative terms might still be inappropriate. The reason is that the received
wisdom concerning the development of scientific knowledge may be misconceived.
The orthodox view is that our understanding of science accumulates by way of
objective analysis founded on the safeguards of replication and corroboration. In fact,
however, even within the natural or physical sciences it cannot be taken for granted
that there is “progress” towards the “truth” by reliance on “scientific method”. This is
because work done from an historical and sociological angle has cast doubt on the
conventional wisdom concerning the accumulation of scientific knowledge.46
Thomas Kuhn has offered the most influential reappraisal of scientific
endeavor through the invocation of terminology such as “paradigms” and “normal
science”.47 Law has certainly not been immune from Kuhn’s influence; legal
academics have on many occasions borrowed from his work to describe trends in the

Mark V. Tushnet, Law, Science, and Law and Economics, 21 HARV J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 47, 51-52 (1997). For a response, see Thomas S. Ulen, The Prudence of Law
and Economics: Why More Economics is Better, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 773, 788-93
(1996).
46

You Can’t Follow the Science Wars Without a Battle Map, ECONOMIST
(London), December 11, 1997, at 109, 109-10.
47

Kuhn’s seminal work was THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3rd
ed. 1996). The book has sold more than a million copies since its initial publication
and it has been described as “the most influential academic work of the second half of
the twentieth century”: Mark Blaug, Book Review, 33 HIST. POL. ECON. 855, 855
(2001).

15

literature.48 It is appropriate, therefore to consider whether the trajectory of legal
scholarship can be characterized appropriately in “Kuhnian” terms.
According to Kuhn,49 within a given field, matters begin in a “preconsensus”,
“immature” or “pre-paradigm” phase.50 This means there is competition between
intellectual schools addressing the same issues from different, mutually incompatible
standpoints. The field subsequently comes together when work is produced that is
sufficiently convincing to persuade members of existing schools to defect and to
attract the next generation of academics. Once a consensus is in place that is focused
on the dominant “paradigm” or “disciplinary matrix”,51 researchers are spared the
incessant and distracting re-examination of first principles. Instead, they can proceed
with confidence to solve “puzzles” by reference to the dominant mode of thought.52

48

To illustrate, a search of Westlaw’s “JLR” directory conducted in July 2003
with the query “‘Thomas Kuhn’ & paradigm” yielded 555 documents. This electronic
database has wide coverage of U.S. law reviews extending back to the early 1980s.
49

It is difficult to do justice to Kuhn’s work when summarizing it, in large part
because Kuhn qualified many of his assertions after the first edition of THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). On this pattern, see Blaug, Book
Review, supra note xx, at 855. For a thorough overview of Kuhn’s work, see PAUL
HOYNINGEN-HEUNE, RECONSTRUCTING SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS: THOMAS S.
KUHN’S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1993). For a succinct, if somewhat critical
summary, see BRENDAN LARVOR, LAKATOS: AN INTRODUCTION 37-44 (1998).
50

KUHN, supra note xx, chapter 2.

51

The shift away from the “paradigm” terminology to “disciplinary matrix” was
an example of Kuhn qualifying his basic concepts as time progressed. See KUHN,
supra note xx, at 182; Blaug, Book Review, supra note xx, at 855.
52

KUHN, supra note xx, chapter 4.
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Such “mop-up work” within a “mature” field of research is known as “normal
science”.53
Kuhn noted that those working in accordance with the precepts of “normal
science” will periodically find inexplicable “anomalies” that are irreconcilable with
the dominant paradigm.54 Over time, he said, an accumulation of serious anomalies
can seriously destabilize the existing consensus and eventually build to a crisis.55 A
fresh competition of ideas will then ensue that could either leave the existing
paradigm intact or culminate in a “scientific revolution” that establishes a new
consensus within the discipline.56 If a “paradigm shift” does occur, normal science
will ultimately recommence under the new worldview, setting the stage for the cycle
to repeat itself.57
According to Kuhn, such “paradigm shifts” do not yield the accumulation of
knowledge in the manner traditionally associated with scientific progress. Instead,
since the preconceptions underlying successive traditions of normal science are
radically different, discerning how the relevant paradigms are interrelated is highly
problematic. In other words, since comparative evaluation cannot be effected by a
neutral, universal set of rules, disciplinary matrixes tend to be “incommensurable”.58
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Id., chapter 3.
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Id., chapter 6.

55

Id., chapter 7.
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Id. at 84.

57

Id., chapters 10, 12.

58

Id. at 102, 110, 112, 147-51.
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Correspondingly, no a priori assumptions can be made as to whether a paradigm shift
constitutes a move towards the “truth” in any objective sense.59 All that can be said is
that the relevant academic community is working within an intellectual mindset that is
addressing more successfully the issues deemed pertinent and topical.60
Kuhn’s argument that “progress” can be explained by reference to “normal
science” and “paradigm shifts” proved infectious outside the realm of natural and
physical sciences.61 For instance, social scientists have frequently discussed their own
particular fields with reference to Kuhn’s insights.62 Also, politicians have drawn
upon his ideas and even popular journalism is replete with references to
“paradigms”.63 Hence, it should not be surprising that legal academics have relied on
his theories to explain trends in legal scholarship. It has been said, for instance, that
“…the legal community, especially the legal academy, bears significant
parallels to the scientific community as Kuhn describes it. Both rely on
standardized textbooks for initiation into the profession; both enjoy substantial

59

Id. at 170-73, 206-7. Kuhn developed his thoughts further in other published
work. For a summary, see HOYNINGEN-HEUNE, supra note xx, 263-64.
60

While many have inferred from Kuhn’s work that one paradigm is just as good
as another, it is open to question whether he believed this: Ulen, Nobel, supra note
xx, 885.
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Louis Menand, Undisciplined, WILSON Q., Autumn 2001, 51, 58-59.
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Esther-Mirjam Sent, Thomas Kuhn: The Wrong Person at the Wrong Time, 63
REV. POL. 390, 390 (2001).
63

Robert Fulford, Paradigm: Putting the “P” Word in Perspective, GLOBE &
MAIL, June 5, 1999, at D9; Wade Roush, Dwarf Standing on Giants, TECH. REV.,
Sept./Oct. 2000, 126 at 126.
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insulation from the laity; both concern day-to-day puzzle solving; and both
display quite similar internal communal structure.”64
Moreover, Kuhn’s notions of normal science, paradigms and so on have been relied
upon to describe intellectual trends in a wide range of areas of the law, including
contracts,65 immigration,66 civil procedure,67 and race relations.68
Despite the borrowing from Kuhn, it is open to question whether law is a
context to which his approach can be fruitfully extended. Kuhn himself generally
sought to distance himself from efforts to use his work outside the scientific field69
and there is reason to believe that this sort of skepticism is appropriate with respect to

64

Steven L. Winter, “Bull Durham” and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
639, 670, n. 162 (1990).
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Alces, Contract, supra note xx, at 79-87.
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George A. Martinez, Race and Immigration Law: A Paradigm Shift [2000] U.
ILL. L. REV. 517.
67

Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling
Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 53 BROOK. L.
REV. 659 (1993).
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Juan F. Perera, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal
Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997).
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Gordon McOuat, The Mistaken Gestalt of Science Studies: Steve Fuller Takes
on Kuhn, 36 CAN. J. HIST. 523, 523 (2001). Kuhn himself said:
“I used to say that if you go through college in science and mathematics you
may well get your bachelor’s degree without having been exposed to the
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. If you go through college in any other
field you will read it at least once. That was not altogether what I wanted
(quoted in Blaug, Book Review, supra note xx at 855).”
See also KUHN, supra note xx, at 208-9.
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legal scholarship.70 We have seen that traditions such as explicit theory-building,
empirical testing, replication and review seem to be lacking with legal scholarship.71
The discrepancies between scientific methodology and the study of law imply, in turn,
that using what Kuhn had to say about science to understand legal scholarship better
is a problematic leap in logic.72
Also noteworthy is that academic writing about law tends to have a strong
normative and pragmatic dimension that is absent from scientific publications.73 To
the extent that legal scholarship simply involves an interchange between those with
differing opinions on foundational issues, legal studies seemingly lack the sort of
consensus that marks out a “mature” field of research. In other words, legal
academics may not have moved beyond the “pre-paradigm” or “immature” phase and
developed the tight research consensus required for “normal science”.74 If this is an
accurate prognosis, then it is inappropriate to think about the evolution of legal
scholarship in Kuhnian terms.
C.

Market Forces and Progress
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Note, though, that Kuhn explicitly identified the use of precedent in judicial
decisions as an example of paradigm elaboration: KUHN, supra note xx, at 23.
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Supra note xx and accompanying text.
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Ziegler, supra note xx, at 573-74; Stempel, supra note xx, at 699.
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Supra note xx and related discussion.
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Rubin, On Beyond, supra note xx, at 895-96; Daintith, supra note xx, at 35657; Charles W. Collier, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship in Search of a Paradigm,
42 DUKE L.J. 840, 842-44 (1993) (noting, though, that legal scholarship in the U.S.
may have formerly possessed a stable paradigm oriented around doctrinal analysis).
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A contentious inference that can be drawn from Kuhn’s work is that science
does not provide a platform for a move towards the “truth” in any objective sense.
The concern in this instance is that the notion that successive scientific theories are
incommensurable lends support to a corrosive form of “anything goes” relativism.75
A debate influenced by the same intellectual dynamics has occurred in relation to
legal scholarship, with the result being much heated discussion about whether the
“quality” of what is published can be evaluated in accordance with any sort of neutral
criteria.76 Regardless, at this point parallels that might be drawn between academic
writing on law on the one hand and scientific methodology or Kuhn’s work on the
other will be set to one side.77 Instead, there will now be analysis of why academic
writing about law, despite shaky scientific credentials, might still “progress”.
It must be acknowledged that, in the present context, the possibility of
meaningful improvement over time cannot be taken for granted. Instead, so long as
debates about relativism remain unresolved, presuming that legal scholarship can
actually become “better” is an inherently contentious step to take. To move the
analysis forward, however, we will assume that meaningful distinctions can in fact be
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See LAUDAN, supra note xx, 8-9, 14-17 (1996); ECONOMIST, supra note xx, at
110. For more background on charges of relativism and Kuhn’s response, see
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Profession Perish, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 343, 356-57, 362-64 (1989).
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These topics can properly be set aside together. This is because, if it is
inappropriate to think of legal scholarship in Kuhnian terms, debates about relativism
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J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J.
949, 964 (1988).
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made on the basis of criteria such as “quality” or “truth”.78 For our purposes, then,
there is scope for progress within legal scholarship. What might drive matters in this
direction if scientific methodology is not invoked on a systematic basis? An answer
worth considering is that market-oriented dynamics act as the catalyst for a move
towards “better” legal scholarship.79
Essentially, the hypothesis under analysis here is that a beneficial competition
among alternatives occurs in a legal scholarship market, thus yielding an improved
understanding of law.80 Legal scholar Herbert Hovenkamp has said of economics:
“The market for economic ideas is no different from the market for products
or services. When a demand appears, someone will try to supply it, from
whatever source.81
Perhaps the same occurs with legal scholarship.82

78

This follows the approach adopted by Kissam, Evaluation, supra note xx, at
254-55. Still, it must be acknowledged that the working assumption is a somewhat
heroic one, since entire volumes have been devoted to ascertaining the precise content
of “truth”. See, for example, RICHARD CAMPBELL, TRUTH AND HISTORICITY (1992).
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On the more general proposition that the operation of market forces can yield
progress, see VAN DOREN, supra note xx, 95-97; NISBET, supra note xx, 187-93, 299
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Chereminsky and Catherine Fisk, In Defense of the Big Tent: The Importance of
Recognizing the Many Audiences for Legal Scholarship, 34 TULSA L.J. 667, 675-76
(1999).
81

(1991).

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, 346

22

To elaborate, with a conventional market for products or services, there are
forces of supply and demand. With respect to legal scholarship, the “supply side”
consists of researchers who write about law. The “demand side” is composed of those
who “consume” what is written, such as legal academics, editors of law reviews, legal
publishers, practicing lawyers, law students and judges. The suppliers in the legal
scholarship market have various incentives to produce “quality” academic work.83
These include the prospect of job security (tenure), nonpecuniary rewards (peer
esteem and satisfaction derived from influencing changes in the law),84 and financial
benefits (increased royalties, better job offers and enhanced consulting opportunities).
Consumers,for their part, can discipline suppliers in various ways.
Manuscripts submitted for publication can be accepted or rejected.85 Books can be
purchased or left to sit on the shelves. “Quality” publications can be cited with
approval in print or discussed favorably as part of hiring or promotion exercises.86
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For background, see sources cited supra note xx as well as George L. Priest,
Triumphs or Failings of Modern Legal Scholarship and the Conditions of its
Production, 63 U. COL. L. REV. 725 (1992).
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See Lasson, supra note xx, at 948-49; Chereminsky and Fisk, supra note xx, at
677-78.
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“(V)anity is the occupational disease of the academic”: David Luban, Legal
Scholarship as a Vocation, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 171 (2001) (quoting Max Weber).
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The criteria applied will vary depending on the intended audience: Banks
McDowell, The Audience for Legal Scholarship, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261, 266-68
(1990).
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Note, though, that consumer preferences in the legal scholarship market are
not homogeneous: Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship
by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659, 686-87 (1998).
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Finally, sloppy work or misguided intellectual frolics can be criticized or simply
ignored.87
There certainly are those who believe that market discipline has caused legal
scholarship to improve and progress over time.88 Still, potential flaws with the market
for legal scholarship, such as it is, must be acknowledged.89 For instance, concerns
have been raised that outside consulting and the underwriting of research by special
interest groups diminish the objectivity of law professors and correspondingly have a
corrupting influence on the quality of legal scholarship.90 Moreover, there is a risk
that once academics have completed whatever probationary period they must serve
before becoming permanent members of a faculty and are otherwise content with their
current status in the job market, they will lack meaningful incentives to produce
scholarship of a high standard.91 On the other hand, empirical evidence on the impact
of the awarding of tenure on academic productivity indicates that implicit incentives

87

On the high percentage of articles in U.S. law reviews which are unread, see
Gava, supra note xx, at 458-60; Rhode, supra note xx, at 1331.
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See sources cited infra notes xx to xx as well as Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers,
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REV. 1921, 1925 (1993).
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Ideas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131, 1139-40 (1981).
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Scholarship, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 993, 996-7, 1001 (1991).
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such as the desire to retain the respect of peers may operate as a sufficient check
against “slacking”.92
Turning to the demand side, there again are potential flaws with the market.
For instance, consumers of academic work may be too busy to evaluate the product
properly. Also, law review editors and publishers will not always have the expertise
required to detect quality.93 Moreover, even if those choosing what will appear in
print are knowledgeable, they may lack incentives to take seriously the priorities of
those who actually read legal scholarship. For instance, the fact that most of
America’s law reviews receive hefty subsidies from their host schools means that for
the students who edit these journals catering to the preferences of the potential
audience does not have to be the top priority.94
Whatever the precise cause, the “end product” does have strong critics. Some
wonder, for instance, if legal scholarship “is at best an other-worldly irrelevance and
at worst a radical and doomed narcissism”.95 Others dismiss much of “what passes
for legal ‘research’…as antediluvian”.96 In the United States, at least, student-run law
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Si Li and Hui Ou-Yang, Incentives, Performance, and Academic Tenure,
unpublished working paper (2003) (providing data indicating that the number of
publications and number of citations generated by economists at leading American
universities is much the same both before and after tenure).
93

Ellickson, Market, supra note xx, at 169 (raising the possibility to cast doubt
upon it).

94

Rhode, supra note xx, at 1356; Priest, Triumphs, supra note xx, at 726-29.
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Birks, ed., 1996).
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reviews are primary targets for critics of legal scholarship. For instance, there
allegedly are too many articles published,97 though defenders of the journals say this
is an unavoidable price associated with the production of legal scholarship which is of
high quality.98 Moreover, the output is regularly chastised for an absence of
eloquence and elegance, unnecessary length and documentation, a lack of originality
and excessive insularity.99 The upshot is that a market for legal scholarship can
potentially foster quality output but it remains open to question whether the forces of
supply and demand are potent enough to ensure that “progress” is the dominant
outcome.
D.

Intellectual Cycles
To this point, we have seen that legal scholarship can potentially be

characterized as the accumulation of knowledge, as the subject matter of “paradigms”
and as the product of an intellectual marketplace. On the other hand, there is reason
to believe that the evolution of academic writing on law cannot be accounted for
purely in terms of models appropriate for scientific literature and is not necessarily the
product of a beneficial interaction of forces of supply and demand. Correspondingly,
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Gava, supra note xx, at 461, 465; Rhode, supra note xx, at 1331; Neil
Duxbury, When Trying is Failing: Holmes’s “Englishness”, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 145,
149-50 (1997). Not everyone agrees. See, for example, Gregory, Assault, supra note
xx, at 998.
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it is appropriate to consider additional factors that might govern the trajectory of legal
scholarship. A possibility that merits consideration is a cyclical dimension. The idea
is that, to at least some degree, the academic analysis of legal issues constitutes a
continuing conversation about pivotal questions.100 As Neil Duxbury, a U.K.
academic, has observed in a book on trends in American jurisprudence:
“Ideas – along with values, attitudes and beliefs – tend to emerge and
sometimes they are revived and refined. But rarely do we see them born or
die. History is not quite like that.” 101
The possibility that legal scholarship has a cyclical quality has been
acknowledged in various contexts. Some observations on the point relate to general
trends. For instance, Duxbury says the received wisdom concerning American legal
thought is that there has been a pendulum swing back and forth between “formalistic”
analysis (e.g. the legal science associated with Langdell and the policy-oriented Legal
Process school of the 1950s and 1960s) and “realistic” views (e.g. the “legal realism”
that supplanted “Langdellism” and the critical legal studies movement of the
1980s).102 Also, in a 1993 law review article entitled “Plus ça Change”, Paul Brest
said that

reviews, see Richard S. Harnsberger, Reflections About Law Reviews and Legal
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“(t)aking everything into account, a law student who fell asleep in 1963 and
awoke in 1993 would not be astonished by his new surrounds. If he had fallen
asleep holding a law review – the soporific power was no weaker in those
days – the nature and language of some of the articles would bewilder him,
but he would find much that is familiar”.103
The same point of view has been echoed in relation to particular aspects of
law. Lawrence Friedman, a founder of the interdisciplinary approach to law known as
the law and society movement, has said that with it “(t)he work does not, in general,
build or grow; it travels in cycles and circles, round and round”.104 With respect to
law and economics, Mark Tushnet observed in a 1998 article entitled “Everything Old
is New Again” that a “new Chicago school” that focuses on the relation between
informal social conventions (“norms”) and law is an unintentional intellectual
descendant from venerable traditions in sociology and anthropology.105 David
Kennedy, an international law academic, referred in an article published in 2000 to a
“pendulum movement” in his discipline and said that “(f)or the past hundred and more
years, the modes of both criticism and reform have remained remarkably stable”.106
Similarly, David Clark, a comparative lawyer, said of his field in 2001 that
“(a)lthough comparative law research has spread to countries in which it did not exist
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in 1900, and the diversity and quality of writing has improved, the basic ideas were
already in place a century ago”.107
Though Clark acknowledged that comparative law scholarship improved in
certain respects during the 20th century, the notion that the trajectory of ideas is
cyclical has a distinctly pessimistic connotation. Essentially, the possibility of linear
advancement seems largely foreclosed if a “rise and fall” pattern predominates.108
Answers to perennial questions may admittedly differ over time. Still, this does not
mean there has been “progress”. Instead, as part of a pendulum-like movement, a
mode of thought that is dominant at a particular point in time might simply be a
candidate for replacement by its polar opposite.
Is such pessimism justified with legal scholarship? Academic debates about
law often do have a recurrent dimension. Still, is it true that there is “nothing new
under the sun”?109 It seems unlikely. One consideration is what former British Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan referred to as “events, dear boy, events”.110 With
academic disciplines oriented to foundational texts, such as philosophy and literature,
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there inevitably will be some tendency to revisit issues previously explored.111 On the
other hand, with legal studies, the topics for debate are unlikely to remain entirely
fixed and constant since law evolves in response to changing social circumstances.
Academics, in turn, are placed under an onus to adjust since good timing is often a
core attribute of successful legal scholarship.112 Correspondingly, when there is a
major change to the law, or an entirely new field of legal regulation emerges, the
parameters for debate necessarily shift.
Even if current events are taken out of the equation, it still remains open to
question whether legal scholarship has a strongly cyclical dynamic. For instance,
with the trajectory of American legal thought, Duxbury has explicitly challenged the
pendulum swing account.113 Indeed, doubts have in fact been cast on whether there
are any serious proponents of this version of history.114 Moreover, Brest’s “plus ça
change, plus ça meme chose” appraisal of the academic study of law in the concluding
decades of the 20th century is not shared universally. Some have argued that, because
of a shift away from doctrinal work in favor of interdisciplinary analysis, there was a
net decline in the social value of legal scholarship.115 Others, however, think that the
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switch in emphasis was a distinct improvement. For instance, a Canadian law
professor observed in 1986 that “(l)egal scholarship has changed dramatically in this
century” and “has dramatically increased what we know about the way law actually
works”.116 A leading US legal academic offered the same verdict a few years later:
“The last quarter century has been a golden age for American legal
scholarship. We have seen a profusion of scholarly publication whose range,
ambition and quality is without compare in the history of American law
schools.”117
Similar sentiments have been expressed to particular subject areas. For
instance, while some comparative lawyers worry that the core ideas in the field have
been around for decades, others are more upbeat. As the president of the International
Academy of Comparative Law observed in 2001
“Methods have been refined, instruments have been developed, courses are
being continuously expanded and reconsidered – all this in the service of a
better comparative law.”118
Tort law is another area where there has been optimism. By the late 1990s
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“leading torts scholars (were) looking back with a sense of accomplishment on
a generation ‘marked by a variety of highly ambitious scholarly
developments’, namely the increasingly sophisticated economic and corrective
justice theories that comprise modern tort theory”.119
Shifting from individual subject areas to particular approaches that can be
adopted to study law, optimists can again be found. It has been said, for instance, that
“(w)ithin the legal academy, the achievements of feminism have been substantial and
cumulative”.120 Moreover, Richard Epstein, a leading law and economics scholar, has
expressed concerns about the future of the discipline but still argues that for a number
of decades “the rate of intellectual return on relatively straightforward problems was
exceedingly high.”121 The upshot is that there appears to be more to legal scholarship
than the plot in the movie “Groundhog Day”, in which Bill Murray was condemned to
wake up each day and find that it was yesterday all over again.
E.

Academic Fads and Fashions
In the foregoing section, a characteristic uniting the academics who were cited

to cast doubt on the cyclical account of legal scholarship was that they were offering
an appraisal of the field that implied things were getting “better”. Still, even if legal
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scholarship does not evolve simply by reference to the past, does this mean that
“progress” is inevitable? Work done by law professor Cass Sunstein on fads, fashions
and academic “cascades” indicates the answer is no.
Sunstein subscribes to the notion that there is a market for legal scholarship
with academics constituting the producers and consumers including other academics,
students, government officials and judges.122 He doubts, however, whether the forces
of supply and demand yield beneficial outcomes in this context.123 Skepticism about
the market for legal scholarship is, as we have seen, not novel.124 Sunstein does more,
however, than suggest there is a case of market failure. Instead, he draws upon social
science literature on fads and fashions to suggest how academic writing about law
might evolve.
To understand the argument Sunstein is making, some background is required.
Typically, when economists model markets they assume that parties have full
information about all relevant circumstances. In the real world, however, people are
not in this position. A way they can compensate is to learn by observing the actions
of others. Correspondingly, when members of a group are cognizant of each other’s
behavior, they can often end up making the same choices. This sort of “herd
behavior” can create a “cascade” that yields a “fad”.125 The decisions of an individual
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with a reputation for being well-informed – a “fashion leader” – can exaggerate the
behavior in question.126
An important aspect of cascades is that, because they are based on weak
information, the conformist behavior involved can occur when the initial choice was
poor. Admittedly, if there is a cascade based around an erroneous premise, the
dissemination of pertinent and persuasive conflicting information can operate as a
corrective.127 Still, the relevant facts may never become fully available so a reversal
cannot be taken for granted.
Sunstein has extended the learning on cascades, fads and so on to the context
of legal scholarship.128 He argues that academic lawyers typically lack reliable
information about what is “true” or “right”.129 As a result, the signals that provide the
foundation for fads can be influential within the legal academy.130 He argues that the
effect is reinforced because legal academics are concerned about their reputations and
thus are cautious about defying a consensus adopted by respected peers.131 Also

Conventions in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 300
(Peter Newman ed., 1998); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000),
chapter 8.
126

Bikhchandani et al., Learning , supra note xx, at 160; Hirshleifer, supra note
xx, at 302.
127

Hirshleifer, supra note xx, at 301, 303.

128

Academia had previously been identified as an environment where the
literature seemed relevant: Hirshleifer, supra note xx, at 305.
129

Sunstein, supra note xx, at 1254.

130

Id. at 1254-56.

131

Id. at 1256-58. This is known as a “reputational cascade”. See Robert C.
Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 26 (2001).

34

significant is that a new line of thinking can coalesce around views adopted by a likeminded group which moves collectively via mutual self-reinforcement towards an
extreme position (“group polarization”).132 This process can, in turn, provide an ideal
platform for “fashion leaders” to act as “polarization entrepreneurs” who amplify
informational signals via the medium of a supportive network of followers.133
Sunstein admits that some fads “burn out” quickly because, once the relevant
points have been raised, little can be done with them.134 Others, he says, can be
displaced by external shocks, such as changes in the political climate or major
innovations in related fields.135 What about fads that endure? Does longevity mean
that the relevant ideas are “good” or “true”? According to Sunstein, no. He
acknowledges that cogent arguments and contradictory evidence can puncture a
misguided set of claims. Still, so long as faulty informational signals, reputational
concerns and “group polarization” continue to fortify a particular fad, bad ideas can
enjoy considerable longevity.136
Sunstein, by applying the literature on cascades to legal scholarship, has
articulated in a systematic fashion sentiments expressed by some others. Roger
Younger scholars do have an incentive to discover novel approaches, but arguably the
legal academy’s reward structure requires that their elders can appreciate the
innovative move as continuing a tradition with which the elders are associated. See
Tushnet, Everything Old, supra note xx, at 581.
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Cramton, an American legal academic, has suggested that “(s)cholarship, perhaps
more than other facets of legal culture, is responsive to fashions”.137 William
Twining, an English legal scholar, has observed that
“it is not unknown within jurisprudence for a book-of-the moment, a robust
debate, or some dramatic event to attract the ad hoc attention of swarms of
jurists like moths to a flame.”138
Duxbury has said more generally that American legal scholarship is “characterized
increasingly by faddishness” and has argued that “American legal theorists are
nothing if not slaves to fashion”.139
For the sake of argument, let us assume fads do influence legal scholarship.
Does this mean that Sunstein’s premise that mistaken ideas can easily become both
influential and durable must be accepted as well? The answer is no. Certainly
Twining does not accept that fads necessarily yield deleterious consequences.
Instead, he says that “(i)f fashion…or intellectual snobbery have produced some
imbalances or distortions within legal theory, these are faults which are quite easily
corrected.”140 Twining does not elaborate on how precisely this might occur.
Presumably, though, he was assuming that fads are fragile since subsequent
intellectual discourse will reveal the faulty nature of the ideas initially advanced.
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Twining, then, is a “cascade optimist” who has faith in the presence of corrective
forces that will spring into action when things have gone badly off the track.
Sunstein, on the other hand, seems to be a “cascade pessimist” who doubts whether
faulty academic fads will be shattered by the dissemination of new information.141
Offering a definitive assessment of the durability of faulty intellectual
cascades is not possible at this juncture since even Sunstein has acknowledged that his
“informal and anecdotal” analysis is only intended to operate as a platform for further
discussion.142 Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a factor which could be relevant,
this being the extent to which legal scholarship circulates in a “closed” or “open”
network.143 Again, an intellectual bandwagon built upon the “wrong” outcome will
tend to be fragile since the release of new data or ideas can expose the erroneous
underpinning of the fad.144 Correspondingly, a misguided legal scholarship cascade
should be more vulnerable when there is a broadly-based audience with a wide range
of expertise than when the relevant field is a small, specialized and insulated.
The network in which legal scholarship circulates can open in various
directions. There can, for instance, be exchanges between those specializing in
different areas of the law or dialogue between legal scholars and academics working
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in other disciplines which offer insights directly pertinent to the analysis of legal
topics. With respect to correcting misguided fads, however, perhaps the most
promising possibility is interchange between law professors and those who work with
the law in a practical setting (e.g. lawyers, judges and government officials dealing
with legal issues).
Consider, for instance, the analysis of the international law field offered by
David Kennedy in a 2000 article.145 Applying the terminology used here, he qualifies
as a “cascade optimist”. This is because he says that ideas in international law which
are useful will be picked up and may contribute to a new disciplinary consensus and
those which are not will be left to one side.146 He says the primary reason for this
outcome is that legal practitioners who deal with international law issues assess the
persuasiveness and ultimate value of academic work. He describes the discipline they
exercise as follows:
“(W)hen practitioner-beings assess things, they do so with their eyes wide
open, unaffected by the fashions and egos that befuddle scholars. Their focus
is relentlessly on the real world where the rubber meets the road, and it is their
judgment, or predictions about their judgment, that guarantees the pragmatism
and political neutrality of the field’s development.”147
Richard Posner has made related suggestions with respect to interdisciplinary
legal scholarship dealing with moral philosophy and bankruptcy law. He argues that
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with legally-oriented debates on moral philosophy “quality control” is likely to be a
serious problem. This is because “a law professor’s article on Hegelian
jurisprudence” might only be read by “other law professors interested in Continental
philosophy” with “no leakage outside that narrow network”.148
Posner is more optimistic about bankruptcy law, where the mathematically
oriented analysis of choice known as game theory has strongly influenced leading
interdisciplinary scholars in the field.149 He acknowledges that a practicing lawyer
would not consult articles on bankruptcy law that apply such an exotic approach. On
the other hand, “treatise writers and other bankruptcy scholars read (this literature)
and (incorporate) their insights into their own, practitioner-friendly works….”150 The
result is that, as with international law, “practitioner beings” ultimately are part of the
feedback loop. Correspondingly, to the extent that open vs. closed networks do
indeed affect the durability of misguided academic fads, a mistaken cascade should be
more durable in the area of moral philosophy than with bankruptcy law.
The notion that a misguided legal scholarship fad will be more vulnerable if
there is an active dialogue between academics and practitioners is consistent with a
broader thesis, namely that the quality of academic writing on law will be better if law
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professors seek consciously to relate their work to the “real world”.151 The belief on
this count is that “(p)ure scholars may be more inclined to espouse views that are
fanciful, extreme, or otherwise ungrounded in reality”.152 The proposition, however,
that the quality of legal scholarship is “better” when academic writing has a strong
practical dimension does not command universal acceptance. One counter-argument
is that legal academics with well-developed professional connections will be
influenced by client preferences, rather than saying what they think “without fear or
favor”.153 Another is that a law professor with tight links to the legal profession will
have neither the time nor the inclination to undertake the sort of writing that
challenges the premises underlying traditional legal analysis.154 Ultimately, then,
even if academic fads are less likely to endure in fields where academics engage in
ongoing dialogue with practitioners, it cannot be taken for granted that the quality of
scholarship will be higher.
F.

Conclusion
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We have now considered a series of potential trajectories for legal scholarship.
Each has a certain plausibility. The idea that our knowledge of the legal system can
accumulate by the proper application of scientific method has had enduring appeal.
On numerous occasions, intellectual trends relating to law have been described in
Kuhnian terms. It is possible to draw analogies from the conventional economic
analysis of markets to offer an optimistic prognosis for legal scholarship. There have
been pendulum swings in the academic literature on law, which implies that there may
be “nothing new under the sun”. Finally, the fact that legal academics cannot possibly
be fully aware of what might be “right” or “true” means that the field is susceptible to
fads.
At the same time, no single account of the manner in which legal scholarship
evolves is fully convincing. To illustrate, the fact that much academic writing about
law is akin to advocacy means it is inappropriate to equate legal scholarship fully with
either the received wisdom concerning natural sciences or Kuhn’s recharacterization
of scientific endeavor. Moreover, while it may be accurate to say that there is a
market for legal scholarship, the manner in which the forces of supply and demand
operate diverges considerably from the pattern with more conventional products or
services. At the same time, there is sufficient evidence that academic writing on law
has become “better” over time to suggest that the pessimism implied by a cyclical
account or Sunstein’s fad-driven thesis is not fully justified.
A related point is that the various trajectories that have been identified are, at
least in some measure, contradictory. For instance, since Kuhn’s work was intended
to cast doubt on the received wisdom on the accumulation of knowledge in the natural
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sciences, legal scholarship seemingly cannot conform both to a Kuhnian framework
and a scientifically-oriented cumulative model. Also, if legal scholarship consists
primarily of a “pendulum swing” conversation about enduring issues, it becomes
difficult to envisage how there could be “progress” of any meaningful sort.
Moreover, Sunstein’s account of fads constitutes an explicit challenge to those who
believe a marketplace of ideas yields better academic writing about law.
Is it possible to disentangle these various accounts of legal scholarship? Is one
trajectory truly predominant? If not, do the dynamics involved necessarily conflict?
Or is it possible for various trajectories to influence the evolution of legal scholarship
simultaneously? Part III of the paper considers these and related questions by way of
a case study, with the focus being on corporate law scholarship. A brief historicallyoriented summary of the literature will begin the discussion. An international
perspective will then be offered. The remainder of part III will consider the extent to
which corporate law scholarship has evolved in accordance with the various
trajectories outlined thus far.
III.
A.
1.

CORPORATE LAW

Corporate Law Scholarship: A Historical Sketch
Corporate Personality
During the 19th century, legislatures in the United States, Britain and other

jurisdictions began to enact “modern” corporate laws that established straightforward
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procedures for incorporating business enterprises.155 The first major theoretical
debate to follow this development concerned corporate “personality”. As legal
historian Morton Horwitz has observed, “(b)eginning in the 1890s and reaching a high
point around 1920, (this was) a virtual obsession in the legal literature”.156
Three camps of opinion could be discerned.157 First, the “fiction” or “artificial
entity” theory held that corporate organizations were mere abstractions that owed their
existence and legitimacy to an official grant of authority (a “concession”) from the
state.158 Second, the contractual/association theory implied that a corporation was not
a product of sovereign intervention but instead was an association constituted by the
aggregation of freely contracting individuals, namely the shareholders.159 Third, the
“real entity” theory held that a corporation was not fictional but instead had a
distinctive personality in the same sense that a human being does. This implied, in
turn, that a corporate entity must be conceptually separate and distinct from those
owning the equity.160
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The dialogue concerning corporate personality was, for its time, strikingly
theoretical in tone and was much more international in orientation than was traditional
with legal discourse.161 Still, by 1930 the debate had largely ended.162 By this time,
the consensus view was that the corporation was an important legal form that could
not be treated, from the law’s point of view, as a mere contractual aggregation. Also,
though corporate personality had to be taken seriously from a legal perspective,
corporate entities could not be analyzed as actual persons. John Dewey, with an
article published in 1926, did much to take the wind out of the corporate personality
debate by saying it was misconceived because of a preoccupation with abstract
concepts rather than concrete things.163
2.

Berle and Means
As the personification of the corporate entity faded as a concern, the stage was

set for American legal academics to think about the corporation in functional rather
than abstract terms. Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ The Modern Corporation and
Private Property,164 originally published in 1932, provided an ideal platform for the
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shift in emphasis.165 The authors analyzed the results of a “corporate revolution” that
had occurred in the US between 1880 and 1930.166 During this period, in many key
industries small closely held firms managed by their founders gave way to big
publicly traded companies characterized by managerial hierarchies. In these “quasipublic corporations”167 widely dispersed shareholders, each lacking a sufficient
financial incentive to intervene directly, left it to professionally trained executives to
deal with matters of importance. The result, according to a phrase Berle and Means
made famous, was a “separation of ownership and control”.168
An inference that many American corporate law scholars drew from Berle and
Means’ separation of ownership and control thesis was that something was seriously
amiss in publicly quoted corporations.169 More precisely, the “managerialist” pattern
Berle and Means had described implied that those in charge of America’s larger
business enterprises were not sufficiently accountable to shareholders.170 As a
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Harvard economist said in 1959, “(a)lmost everyone now agrees that in the large
corporation, the owner is, in general a passive recipient; that typically control is in the
hands of management; and that management normally selects its own
replacements”.171 The inference many drew was that managers of large corporations
were “irresponsible oligarchs”.172
Academics who were concerned about the uneven balance of power between
managers and shareholders advocated various types of reform. These included
fostering more participation by investors in corporate affairs (activating “shareholder
democracy”),173 strengthening the fiduciary duties top executives owe to their
companies174 and advocating strict monitoring of management by “outside” directors
lacking any compromising link with management.175 Still, while corporate law
academics frequently invoked the separation of ownership and control thesis to
advocate stronger shareholder rights, this was not the only argument in favor of
regulation that could be derived from The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
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Instead, Berle and Means’ “analysis was a gun on a rotating platform that could be
pointed in more than one direction.”176
Most notably, The Modern Corporation and Private Property posed, if
indirectly, the question: should the legal system make those managing corporations
accountable to society as a whole? The effect was to cast doubt on the received
wisdom under U.S. law, which was that the objective of corporations is to generate
profits for their shareholders (“shareholder primacy”).177 Berle and Means themselves
stressed that power was increasingly being concentrated in the hands of large
companies.178 This in turn implied that the corporation needed to be understood as a
social and political institution, not merely an economic entity.179 Various U.S.
academics, taking their cue from The Modern Corporation and Private Property,
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cited the growing power of corporations to advocate changing the law to address
concerns about corporate social responsibility.180
In 1962, one of the authors of The Modern Corporation and Private Property
observed that their work had achieved the status of “folklore” within the legal
academy.181 American law professors concurred. In 1984 Roberta Romano observed
that “after half a century, discussion of the corporate form still invariably begins with
Berle and Means’ location of the separation of ownership and control as the master
problem for research”.182 Henry Manne put the point even more strongly, saying in
1987 that “(n)o field of American law has ever been so totally dominated by one work
as the corporation law area by the Berle and Means classic”.183
3.

Contractarian Analysis
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While Berle and Means’ work strongly influenced U.S. corporate law
scholarship, the inferences drawn from it were subjected to increasingly critical
scrutiny as the 20th century drew to a close. A pivotal step in this process was the
emergence of the economically-oriented “contractarian” model of the corporation.
Prior to the 1970s, economists treated the business enterprise, typically referred to as a
firm, as a “black box” that operated so as to maximize profits.184 The situation then
changed.185 Economists began to concern themselves with how the conflicting
objectives of individual participants associated with firms might be aligned so as to
yield the hypothesized focus on profit maximization.186 The prevailing view became
that market exchanges did not end at a firm’s front door. Instead, the internal
organization of business enterprises was the result of voluntary exchanges dictated by
market forces. At the same time, market dynamics defined the relationship between a
firm and its suppliers, customers, creditors and so on. The firm, in short, was a
“nexus of contracts”.187
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A pivotal aspect of the nexus of contracts model was “agency cost” theory.188
Again, the Berle-Means analysis of the widely held company implied that
shareholders potentially might be subjected to the untrammeled whims of powerful
executives. Agency cost theory provided an analytical framework for examining this
divergence of interest. The starting point with the theory was that, whenever one
individual (“the principal”) depends upon another (“the agent”), from an economic
perspective an agency relationship arises.189 Since agents do not receive all of the
returns from the profit enhancing activities they engage in on behalf of their
principals, they will always be tempted to put their own interests first. When agents
in fact do so, the result is “agency costs”. In a corporation with widely dispersed
share ownership the shareholders, as principals, depend on management, as agents, to
operate the business profitably. Self-serving or reckless managerial conduct therefore
creates agency costs for investors.
While agency cost theory characterized in a systematic way the sort of
incentive problems which Berle and Means had identified, it did more than this. It
implied as well that executives in widely held public companies were not as
unaccountable as the separation of ownership and control thesis suggested. This is
because agency cost theory offered an intellectually elegant account of various
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market-oriented limitations on the exercise of managerial discretion.190 One such
constraint is the labor market for executives (senior managers want to run companies
well to impress potential alternative employers).191 Another is the market for a
company's products or services (executives will lose their jobs if a decline in market
share is sufficiently precipitous to cause the company to fail). Also significant is the
capital market (companies which want to raise money receive less advantageous terms
if there is evidence of mismanagement). The market for corporate control constitutes
an additional constraint on managerial misconduct since bidders, intent on generating
profits by installing new executives, can make offers to the buy the outstanding equity
of poorly run companies.
In addition to providing a platform for re-evaluating the position of
management, the nexus of contracts model opened the way for a reconceptualization
of the shareholder’s status within the corporation. As exemplified by the phrase
“separation of ownership and control”, shareholders have often been characterized as
the “owners” of a company.192 Contractarian analysis dispenses with this “tenacious
notion”193 and instead treats those who own equity as “residual claimants”.194 From a
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contractual perspective, shareholders are defined in this way because they are the
ultimate beneficiaries of whatever success a company enjoys, in the sense that the
return on their investment is based on what is left over after other claims the company
is obliged to meet have been satisfied.195 Hence, while others who are part of a
corporate nexus of contracts will contract to receive fixed cash sums (e.g. creditors
and employees), the return a company’s equity yields is variable in nature and is a
function of the net cash flow the business generates over time.196
If shareholders in a company merely constitute one constituency that is part of
a nexus of contracts, one could infer that the “shareholder primacy” principle that has
influenced U.S. corporate law is misguided.197 “Contractarians”, however, did not
embrace such logic and instead sought to justify the pre-eminent position of
shareholders. They defended shareholder primacy on the grounds that equity
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investors, as residual claimants, have strong incentives to encourage maximum
corporate achievement in a manner that benefits their fixed claim counterparts.198
Advocates of the nexus of contracts model also cited the respective bargaining
positions of shareholders and non-shareholder constituencies to make their case. The
point made was that creditors, employees and customers can feasibly bargain for
protection whereas shareholders cannot because of the open-ended nature of an
investment in corporate equity.199
When the nexus of contracts model first arrived on the scene, various legal
academics argued forcefully that it was inappropriate to conceptualize the corporation
as a nexus of contracts.200 Nevertheless, the analytical framework ultimately proved
to be highly influential, at least in the American context. In fact, “(l)aw and
economics…swept the academic corporate law area like prairie fire”,201 so that by
early 1990s “the dominance of the nexus of contracts model in the legal academy”
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was becoming widely recognized.202 By the end of the decade matters had progressed
to the point where the proposition “(t)hat a firm (such as a corporation) can be thought
of as a ‘nexus of contracts’…ha(d) becom(e) something of a cliché in the
university”.203 Indeed, there currently are those who believe that “(e)very book and
journal article in the corporate law field ha(s) to take an economics of law perspective
if they (are) to succeed in the marketplace of ideas.”204
4.

The Nexus of Contracts Model as a Point of Departure
While contractarian analysis is currently the dominant school of thought

among academic corporate lawyers in the U.S., its influence is in fact not monolithic.
Instead, there a significant number of American corporate law academics who have
serious misgivings about the nexus of contracts model.205 Those who have their
doubts typically do not reject the economic approach in its entirety. Instead, they tend
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to accept the nexus of contracts as a pivotal analytical construct and use it as a point
of departure so as to develop a more fully rounded conception of corporate law.206
One move made by those who are uneasy with the nexus of contracts model
has been to invoke the concept of social norms. The core belief is that the corporation
is a prime domain of informal rules of conduct that do as much or more than
enforceable legal obligations to shape and determine corporate behavior.207 The
nexus of contracts model allegedly is not capable of making suitable allowances for
this pattern since it tends to assume away gaps in contractual documentation
governing relations between those associated with companies.208 Correspondingly,
proponents of norms-oriented analysis say their approach offers a richer
understanding of the interface between law and corporate activity than a standard
economic framework.209
A potential limitation with a norms-oriented approach to corporate law is that
it may end up constituting a useful but limited adjunct to contractarian thinking rather
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than becoming a self-sufficient and robust analytical framework.210 Still, work done
on the extralegal norm or practice of “trust” does offer an affirmative model that is
intended to account in a systematic fashion for key aspects of corporate activity.
More particularly, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have used trust as a departure point
in asserting that the corporation is best understood as a team of people who enter into
a complex agreement to work together for mutual gain.211 These academics argue
that, with a company, individuals typically devote themselves to the firm in the hopes
of sharing the benefits flowing from “team production”. Those who do so tend not to
seek full contractual protection for the “firm-specific” investments being incurred.212
Instead, according to Blair and Stout, they trust the board of directors to balance the
interests of the constituencies associated with the corporation in an unbiased manner.
The upshot is that the board is supposed to function as a “mediating hierarchy”.213
Blair and Stout say that the board of directors cannot provide a suitable
rallying point for team production if it is simply a proxy for shareholder interests.
Instead, they argue, the board must be an unbiased broker amongst a corporation’s
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various constituencies.214 Correspondingly, Blair and Stout’s work constitutes an
economically-oriented challenge to the “shareholder primacy” notion many
contractarians advocate.215 The pair concedes that giving the board the discretion
required to act as a neutral arbiter can give rise to agency problems since individual
directors may have little or no financial stake in the firm.216 Nevertheless, with
cultural norms of fairness and trust encouraging directors to serve the team in a
faithful and “other-regarding” fashion, the benefits arising from the proper coordination of team production allegedly exceed the costs.217
Blair and Stout defend their argument that boards will function in an “otherregarding” manner by referring to experimentally oriented “behavioral economics”
research.218 A pivotal lesson this literature offers is that, in particular test
environments, people sacrifice their economic self-interest in order to be, or to appear,
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“fair”.219 The experimental data currently available is compelling enough to justify
corporate law scholars paying attention to potential cognitive biases that are
inconsistent with mainstream economic thinking.220 Still, it remains unclear at present
whether in real-world corporate settings the biases revealed in the behavioral
economics literature operate to a significant degree.221 Hence, it is an open question
whether corporate boards are likely to act as the neutral brokers hypothesized by Blair
and Stout.
The team production model does not stand alone as an attempt to use
contractarian analysis as a jumping off point to develop a more nuanced conception of
the corporation. Law professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have also
taken steps in this direction by emphasizing the proprietary aspect of business
firms.222 They explicitly acknowledge that a firm constitutes a nexus of contracts but
note that business is most often conducted through the medium of legal entities rather
than simply via “contractual cascades”.223 Hansmann and Kraakman explain this on
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the basis that organizational law permits the formation of a firm that can have
ownership of assets of its own.
Corporate law, which is a key subset of organizational law, operates in two
important ways with respect to the ownership of assets. First, according to Hansmann
and Kraakman’s analysis, incorporation permits “affirmative” asset partitioning,
which involves assigning to a company’s creditors a claim on corporate property that
has priority over any rights of the personal creditors of the shareholders.224 Also,
corporate law facilitates “defensive” asset partitioning, which encompasses shielding
the assets of a corporation’s shareholders from corporate creditors via limited
liability.225 Hansmann and Kraakman acknowledge, consistent with analysis offered
from a contractarian perspective, that defensive asset partitioning could be achieved
by contract.226 They assert, however, that it is effectively impossible to create
affirmative asset partitioning using basic tools of property, contract and agency law,
thus making corporate law “essential”.227
B.

The International Dimension
Implicitly, the foregoing account of the evolution of corporate law scholarship

has had an American orientation. The reason is simple. While the debate about
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corporate personality that took place at the beginning of the 20th century had a distinct
international dimension,228 subsequently Americans have set the tone with theoretical
work on corporate law.229 What, then, has been the position with corporate law
scholarship elsewhere? The general trend has been to avoid analyzing the subject
matter in interdisciplinary terms. For instance, in continental Europe, “hermetically
sealed doctrinal analysis” has traditionally dominated the corporate law field and
continues to do so at present.230 The situation was, at least until quite recently, the
same in the United Kingdom. The doctrinal orientation of the relevant literature led
one critic to say in 1986:
“(C)ompany lawyers lack an intellectual tradition which places the particular
rules and doctrines of their discipline within a broader theoretical framework
which gives meaning and coherence to them.”231
Canadian and Australian corporate law scholarship yielded similar harsh verdicts.232
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The doctrinal orientation that has prevailed outside the United States appears
to be eroding.233 In continental Europe, those legal academics interested in
accountability and decision-making within publicly quoted companies (“corporate
governance”) are increasingly looking at issues from an interdisciplinary
perspective.234 In Britain, Australia and Canada matters have evolved further.
Theoretical company law scholarship is now quite well-established, with a growing
literature emerging in all three countries.235
Since the shift towards interdisciplinary analysis has been recent in
orientation, the nexus of contracts model that has influenced the American literature
so strongly has inevitably had an impact on theoretical research being conducted
outside the U.S.236 Indeed, observers in Australia, Canada and the U.K. generally
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acknowledge that the nexus of contract model has been dominating the theoretical
discourse.237 Still, while the economic approach to corporate law that has been so
influential in the United States has attracted attention elsewhere, its impact has varied.
Canadian scholars look regularly to the law and economics literature to give shape to
their analysis of corporate law issues.238 In Britain, on the other hand, there is a
tendency to acknowledge law and economics, cite its limitations and shift to a
different theoretical ground.239 A typical move U.K. academics currently make is to
discuss the company by reference to “stakeholder theory”, which entails analyzing
corporate issues by reference to employees and others potentially having a “stake” in
a business (e.g. suppliers, customers and perhaps society at large).240
C.

Corporate Law Scholarship as Science
With the key themes in corporate law scholarship duly accounted for, it is now

possible to consider the extent to which the literature has evolved in accordance with
the various potential trajectories considered in Part II of the paper. Let us begin with
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the accumulation of knowledge by scientific investigation. Again, the methodology
involved is an enquiry founded upon the safeguards of explicit theory-building,
replication and corroboration.241 Has this analytical technique had a substantial
influence on the trajectory of corporate law scholarship? This question will now be
assessed by examining circumstances where the explicit formulation and testing of
hypotheses plausibly could have played a role.
Berle and Means’ analysis of the corporate economy in the United States
constitutes the first instance that merits consideration. A pivotal component of their
work can certainly be characterized in scientific terms. Again, Berle and Means
hypothesized that, at the time they were writing (1932), there was a separation of
ownership and control in large companies in the U.S. They did not, however, leave
matters at that. Instead, they sought to prove the point by defining when a corporation
had sufficiently diffuse share ownership to qualify as management controlled and by
finding out how equity was in fact distributed in the country’s larger business
enterprises.242 Since Berle and Means’ work had this strong empirical dimension,
subsequent researchers could scrutinize their methodology and seek to affirm or refute
the results by way of their own investigations.243 Correspondingly, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property did have a scientific aspect.

240

PETTET, supra note xx, at 66, n. 105 (citing examples from the “immense”
literature);

241

Supra note xx and related discussion.

242

BERLE AND MEANS, supra note xx, Book I, chs. 4, 5.

243

On efforts made to follow up on Berle and Means’ empirical work, see
ROBERT J. LARNER, MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND THE LARGE CORPORATION 6-24
(1970).

63

Still, the scientific credentials of Berle and Means’ work must be kept in
perspective. Contrary to what a scientist might have done, Berle and Means did not
restrict themselves to describing an empirical phenomenon in value-free
terminology.244 Instead, they condemned the separation of ownership and control in
explicitly normative terms, identified lax corporate law doctrines as contributing to an
allegedly abusive arrangement and suggested how tougher laws might improve
matters.245 Legal academics examining the status of directors and shareholders
subsequently went a step further and simply assumed there was a problem that needed
to be solved and recommended increased regulation as a solution.246 Matters
ultimately reached the point where corporate law scholarship lacked any genuine
scientific pretensions. As law professor John Coffee observed in 1977:
“Although lawyers as a group are frequently inattentive to developments in
allied social sciences, the field of corporation law presents an egregious
example of cultural lag. Dominated by centuries-old fiduciary
concepts…corporate law has not considered to any significant degree the
relevance of social science.”247
The second instance where scientific methodology plausibly could have
influenced corporate law scholarship involved the use of economic theory. Very soon
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after Coffee bemoaned the minimal impact that social science was having on the
corporate law field, the economic “prairie fire” began.248 Again, an alleged virtue of
law and economics is that it allows for the accumulation of knowledge in a scientific
fashion since empirically disprovable hypotheses can be produced and tested.249
Certain advocates of the economic approach to corporate law have indeed advanced
this proposition in order to press the case in favor of contractarian analysis.250 Critics
in turn were prepared to concede the point to some degree, saying that economic
theory was a “valuable addition to the toolbox”251 and had left “the central underlying
issues in corporate law exposed as never before.”252
In at least one respect, economic analysis indeed did make corporate law
research more “scientific”. The innovation in question was the introduction of event
study methodology, which measures unexpected changes in share prices due to the
adoption of new corporate law rules, judicial rulings or decisions taken by
corporations.253 Event studies have a scientific aspect because they provide
researchers with the opportunity to formulate theories about the impact which a
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particular action is likely to have on shareholders and then carry out testing by using
share price fluctuations as a metric. Event study research has been carried out with
increasing regularity since the 1980s and the result now is that no important topic of
corporate governance has been left untouched.254
The invocation of economic analysis may well have introduced additional
intellectual rigor to the study of corporate law. Nevertheless, the influence of
scientific methodology should not be exaggerated. Event studies, for instance, are not
necessarily models of experimental precision. Instead, their utility is intrinsically
linked to contestable assumptions that share prices react quickly to new information
and are a reliable indicator of firm value.255
Moving outside the realm of event studies, economically-oriented research on
corporate law has shaky scientific credentials. If scientific methodology was truly
influential, practitioners of the economic approach to corporate law would
systematically generate the sort of predictions that can be verified or falsified on an
empirical basis.256 Examples of this approach can certainly be found. For instance,
over the past few years, various financial economists have used statistical measures of
corporate law “quality” and cross-border data on share ownership to test the
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proposition that strong shareholder protection yields robust securities markets and a
separation of ownership and control in large firms.257 The hypotheses advanced by
economically-oriented corporate law academics have generally tended, however, to
involve imprecise variables such as “third-party effects” and “transaction costs”.258
The danger correspondingly exists that their models can predict “any conceivable
position that the law might take. No falsifiable conclusion has been reached; no act of
science has been committed”.259 We have already seen that doubts have been
expressed about the scientific status of economic analysis of law.260 It would seem
that, despite useful empirical work, concerns of this sort are justified in the particular
context of corporate law.
D.

Corporate Law Paradigms
Kuhn’s characterization of knowledge evolving by reference to “normal

science” and “paradigm shifts” has proved infectious outside the realm of natural
science.261 Corporate law has not escaped the trend. Instead, various academics
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seeking to characterize intellectual trends in the field have relied on Kuhn’s
terminology.262
A plausible Kuhnian précis of corporate law scholarship can certainly be
offered. It might proceed as follows. The debate over corporate personality that took
place prior to 1930 would qualify as corporate law’s “immature” phase since there
was little agreement about how to define the corporation.263 Berle and Means’
separation of ownership and control thesis then marked a decisive break because it
was sufficiently convincing to become the dominant paradigm within the field of
corporate law.264 After the emergence of the separation of ownership and control as a
pivotal intellectual construct, a period of normal science followed where the focus
was on regulatory strategies designed to address the “core” problem Berle and Means
had identified.
According to Kuhn, the discovery of inexplicable “anomalies” that are
irreconcilable with the dominant paradigm can puncture the consensus associated

262

See infra notes xx and xx and accompanying text.

263

“Paradigm” terminology has been used to describe the corporate personality
debate: Stephen Bottomley, Taking Corporations Seriously: Some Considerations
for Corporate Regulation, 19 FED. L. REV. 203, 206-13 (1990). This usage, however,
is inconsistent with Kuhn’s analytical framework since he assumed that consensus,
not disagreement, was required for there to be a paradigm within the relevant field.
For a more nuanced use of Kuhn’s terminology with respect to the debate over
corporate personality, see Mark, Personification, supra note xx, at 1466, n. 66.
264

Examples of those who have described Berle and Means’ work in this way
include Bratton, Economic, supra note xx, at 180; Carney, Legacy, supra note xx, at
217, 224; Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market)
Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 304 (1991).

68

normal science.265 With the Berle and Means’ paradigm, a paradox which emerged
was that the separation of ownership and control had not created appreciable concern
among those allegedly most affected, namely shareholders.266 Or as Henry Manne
said in 1970:
“…if things were as Berle believed, it is very difficult to understand why 30
million Americans would continue to put money into the hands of corporate
executives….We would have to assume that American investors were either
the greatest collection of fools the world had ever seen or that they were
charitable to a degree that even saints could not aspire to.”267
Manne’s explanation for what was going on was that corporate executives were not as
unaccountable as they seemed. As he explained in a series of articles he wrote in the
1960s, market constraints, such as the market for corporate control, the capital market
and product markets, served to curb managerial discretion.268
In Kuhnian terms, Manne’s provocative critique of the received wisdom
signaled a crisis within corporate law scholarship.269 A “scientific revolution” then
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ensued, this being the emergence of the nexus of contracts model in the 1970s. The
subsequent contractarian “prairie fire” then left economic analysis as the dominant
paradigm in corporate law.270 Continuing to the present day, the academic study of
corporate law currently is in a period of “normal science” where most theoretical
analysis is conducted through the prism of economics. Nevertheless, the work being
done on norms, the team production model and asset partitioning constitute
sufficiently ambitious departures from the prevailing mode of analysis to suggest that
the existing consensus might be unstable or eroding.271 Perhaps, then, a new
“paradigm shift” is imminent.272
While it is certainly possible to rely on Kuhn’s analytical framework to
describe the evolution of academic writing on corporate law, the “fit” is far from
perfect. Again, relying on Kuhn’s work to characterize trends in legal scholarship
involves a problematic leap in logic since he was focusing on scientific methodology
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and this is not the dominant mode of enquiry in law.273 This objection is pertinent in
the present context because, as we have just seen, the scientific credentials of
corporate law research are shaky.274
Even if it is taken for granted that academic writing on law can be properly
evaluated in Kuhnian terms, it may still not be appropriate to talk about the evolution
of corporate law scholarship in terms of paradigms, normal science and so on. This is
because the sort of tight research consensus that distinguishes a “mature” field of
research from its “pre-paradigm” counterpart may have been lacking. Consider the
nexus of contracts model which is currently dominant in American corporate law
scholarship. Despite its pre-eminence, the efforts that are currently being made to
expand the research agenda via the analysis of norms, trust and proprietary concepts
illustrate that the model is not accepted on an unqualified basis. Also, there are
various American corporate law academics who simply remain largely
unconverted.275
Taking the situation outside the U.S. into account casts even more doubt on
the idea that corporate law can be thought of by reference to a tight research
consensus. Berle and Means’ work was the key point of departure in the U.S. from
the 1930s to the 1980s. Elsewhere, however, the situation was different since
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academics focused almost entirely on doctrinal research.276 Turning to the present
day, the nexus of contracts model is certainly influential in Canada and Australia as
well as the U.S.277 In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, economic analysis is
not dominant and in continental Europe it is only just beginning to establish a
foothold.278 The upshot is that, unless one is prepared to treat an individual country
such as the U.S. as the appropriate reference point, corporate law has consistently
lacked the disciplinary matrix that Kuhn argued was required for academics to engage
in “mopping up” activity.279
E.

Corporate Law Scholarship and the Marketplace for Ideas
The assumption made earlier, if only for the sake of argument, was that there

is scope for progress within legal scholarship.280 Under such conditions, a
marketplace for ideas can potentially act as the catalyst for a move towards “better”
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academic writing on law.281 Is there evidence of a market-driven momentum towards
“improvement” in the corporate law field? Though the case is not clear cut, there is
indeed some.
First, the “bad” news on progress. Criticisms about unnecessary length and
documentation have been leveled against legal scholarship.282 Such vices can
certainly afflict academics writing about corporate law. For instance, an article in the
closely related field of securities regulation that explored a single section of a single
statute currently holds the record for the longest law review article.283
More generally, when matters are considered in historical terms, corporate law
can legitimately stand accused of lacking a distinguished intellectual pedigree.
According to one pessimist, as of 1962 “corporation law, as a field of intellectual
effort, (was) dead in the United States”.284 Matters seemingly had improved little by
1984, when Romano characterized corporate law as “an uninspiring field for
research”.285
A similarly bleak prognosis has been offered at various junctures elsewhere.
In Canada, in the mid-1980s critics of the country’s corporate law scholarship decried

281

Supra notes xx to xx and related discussion.

282

Supra notes xx to xx and accompanying text.

283

Arnold S. Jacobs, An Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209 (1987), which is over 490 pages in length and has
some 4800 footnotes. On its status as the article with the most footnotes, see Rhode,
supra note xx, at 1334-35; Lasson, Scholarship, supra note xx, at 937-38.
284

Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245, n. 37 (1962).

73

the “invisibility of contextual and theoretical influences” and alleged that the “choice
of topics and methods for scholarly examination appears to have generally been an
unsystematized exercise of personal preferences.”286 In Britain, company law was not
even recognized as a respectable academic subject until at least the 1950s.287 With
respect to the rest of Europe, in 2000 a reviewer of a book on corporate governance
bemoaned “the hermetically sealed doctrinal analysis common in Continental, and
especially German law”.288
Now, the “good” news: the pessimism about corporate law scholarship has
dissipated to a significant degree. Dan Prentice, a leading British company law
scholar, remarked in 1993 that academic writing on the topic had “improved
immeasurably in terms of quality” during the previous decade.289 Robert Yalden, a
Canadian legal practitioner, argued in 1999 that “the level and quality of scholarship
concerning Canadian corporate law ha(d) improved considerably in the past years 30
years”.290 With respect to the United States, in 1992 Romano reversed her pessimistic
1984 appraisal, saying that corporate law had undergone “a revolution over the past
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decade”.291 Richard Buxbaum, another U.S. law professor, said in 1993 that a new
generation of corporate law academics was “tearing up the track and making
corporation law the hottest game in town”.292 Deborah DeMott, also an American
legal academic, echoed the same sentiments in 1996. She said that there had been
“invigorated discussion and deepened analysis” in a field where the literature had
been “uninspiring” and “parochial” in scope.293
Those who have argued that there has been a beneficial transformation of
corporate law scholarship in recent years have generally acknowledged that the
invocation of economic analysis has had a pivotal influence. For instance, Yalden
noted “that the law and economics movement has had a profound impact on the way
in which corporate law is taught in Canada”294 and Prentice explicitly recognized the
substantial effect economic analysis has had on corporate law scholarship.295
Similarly, in the United States, the economic approach to corporate law has been
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credited for revitalizing “among the sleepiest of legal fields”.296 As Lyman Johnson, a
self-confessed law and economics septic, said in 1992 about economic analysis:
“Few can doubt that corporate law – long a field heavily doctrinaire and
almost nontheoretical – has forever been changed (and bettered) over the past
dozen years by this infusion”.297
Romano, Buxbaum and DeMott each offered a similar verdict when giving their
optimistic appraisals of corporate law scholarship.298 The upshot is that, even if
“progress” cannot be taken for granted in the area of corporate law, there is a
widespread belief that the admittedly controversial law and economics “prairie fire”
did yield a “better” understanding of the topics under investigation.
F.

Corporate Law Cycles
The admittedly optimistic characterization of corporate law scholarship just

presented has a potentially weak foundation since the underlying premise was that
“progress” results from a marketplace for ideas. Market failure may, however, be
prevalent in the area of legal scholarship.299 Correspondingly, it cannot be taken for
granted that things really have gotten “better” or, if they have, they will continue to do
so. An alternate scenario that merits consideration is that much of what is being said
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now has been said before. This is because a potential trajectory for legal scholarship
is cyclical, in the sense that the literature constitutes a continuing conversation about
pivotal questions.300
This possibility has in fact been recognized in corporate law scholarship. As
one corporate lawyer observed in a law review article published in 1991, “(o)ne of the
characteristics of corporation law, and indeed, perhaps of life, is that few issues are
ever settled conclusively”.301 Similar sentiments were echoed in another essay
published a few years earlier, where it was said that, because of the “ebb and flow of
popular conceptions”, “(t)o address the future of corporation law, we must look first
to the past”.302
The question “what is a corporation?” illustrates that the cyclical perspective is
potentially instructive.303 For instance, the nexus of contracts model that has been so
influential in the past two decades has rhetoric in common with the
“contractual/association” thesis that was being offered in the early 20th century.304
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Also, there may be links between the “fiction” theory that corporate organizations
owe their existence to an official grant of authority from the state and Hansmann and
Kraakman’s contemporary work concerning asset partitioning.305 This is because
both imply the state makes available to those relying on the corporate form something
that could not be attained privately.306
“Are managers sufficiently accountable?” and “on whose behalf are
companies run?” qualify as two additional questions that illustrate the potentially
cyclical quality of corporate law scholarship.307 With respect to managerial
accountability, as we have seen, Berle and Means’ The Modern and Corporation and
Private Property flagged this as a pivotal topic.308 Until the 1980s, the consensus was
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that state intervention was required to keep corporate executives in line.309
Contractarians subsequently adopted a more deregulatory posture but nevertheless did
continue to focus on managerial accountability via agency cost theory.310 Corporate
governance scandals afflicting major American companies such as Enron Corp. have
kept the topic in the spotlight and might ultimately yield a intellectual pendulum
swing back in favor of tighter regulation.311
Turning to corporate goals and responsibilities, legal debates on this stretch
from the 1930s to the present day.312 The prevailing view under U.S. law is that
companies exist for their shareholders.313 Some inferred from Berle and Means’
work, though, that companies must have obligations that extend beyond those owning
equity.314 Contractual analysis was subsequently invoked to support the status quo.
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Following on from this, the team production model and stakeholder-oriented
scholarship currently offer a challenge to the notion of shareholder primacy.315
It may well be that in the area of corporate law there are certain questions
which have endured as topics and will continue to do so. Hence, it seems quite likely
that in future decades academics will be asking “what is a corporation?”, “are
managers sufficiently accountable?” and “on whose behalf are companies run?”316
Still, caution is required so as to avoid attaching undue weight to a cyclical account of
corporate law theory.
One reason to be circumspect is that the existence of perennial issues does not
necessarily displace other potential trajectories we have considered thus far. For
instance, the presence of enduring questions can be consistent with evolution along
Kuhnian lines. This is because in order for a paradigm shift to occur, the new theory
must not only be able to cope with the anomalies that caused a crisis for the old theory
but also must address satisfactorily most, if not all, familiar problems.317
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Similarly, though a cyclical trajectory has a pessimistic connotation,318 the
presence of enduring questions does not necessarily preclude potential “progress”.
Consider managerial accountability.319 Contractarians admittedly explored issues that
Berle and Means’ separation of ownership and control thesis had already raised. Still,
the effort to put corporate law on a different theoretical footing did have an effect on
the discourse.320 Arguably, the explicit recognition of market forces constituted an
intellectual advance since the resulting scholarship addressed a key paradox
associated with the initial formulation of the separation of ownership and control
thesis.321 This, again, is why did generations of investors continue to buy shares when
they were being fooled or overpowered by self-serving executives?322
An additional reason a cyclical account of academic writing on corporate law
should be treated with caution is that uncritical acceptance of this point of view might
create a misleading impression of stability and predictability. To elaborate, there may
well be much more going on than the revisiting of the same issues again and again.
Instead, it may be that “future contours of corporate legal theory are
imponderable”.323 Past experience illustrates that the potential certainly exists for
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movements in apparently random directions.324 For instance, an academic writing at
the beginning of the 1970s who forecast that an economically-oriented “prairie fire”
was imminent probably would have been dismissed as foolish. A prediction made a
decade or more later about the current interest in the study of social norms might well
have yielded similar ridicule.325 It is fair to say, then, that one cannot outline how
corporate law scholarship will evolve in the future simply by considering the past.
G.

Fads and Fashions in Corporate Law
The fact that seemingly unpredictable trends have emerged in the academic

literature on corporate law does more than cast doubt on a cyclical account of
literature in the discipline. This pattern suggests also that the field might be subject to
fads and fashions. This is because Cass Sunstein, in arguing that “cascades” influence
legal scholarship, maintains this means that it is difficult to foresee new trends in the
academic study of law. He reasons that, as in social life, “small sparks cause
wildfires” in legal scholarship.326 Correspondingly, seemingly random movements
“can produce a sudden ‘rush’ toward a particular methodology or point of view”.327
There certainly are aspects of corporate law scholarship that fall into line with
Sunstein’s analysis of legal scholarship. For instance, he asserts that external shocks
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can constitute a crucial reason why an academic bandwagon might start.328 The
influence which Berle and Means’ work on the separation of ownership and control
had can be accounted for at least partially on this basis. In the 1920s, some observers
drew attention to growing dispersion of share ownership and to the erosion of
shareholder influence.329 These efforts were not ignored but failed to capture the
imagination in the same manner Berle and Means’ analysis did.330 The stock market
crash of 1929 and the ensuing Depression likely constituted a crucial intervening
feature. The audience for The Modern Corporation and Private Property likely was
much more alert and receptive to Berle and Means’ critical analysis of revolutionary
changes affecting U.S. corporations than would have been the case in better economic
times.331
External shocks also plausibly contributed to the popularity of the nexus of
contracts model. According to Sunstein, developments in adjacent fields can help to
prompt an academic cascade.332 This characterization is potentially apt for the
economic analysis of corporate law. This is because the work which economists
began to do in the 1970s on the market dynamics functioning within firms provided
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the platform for the contractarian “prairie fire” which subsequently swept the
corporate law field.333
The general intellectual climate may also have constituted an external shock
that contributed to the “victory” of economic analysis. There was a growing
disenchantment with government regulation in the U.S. during the 1980s and,
coincident with this, the analysis of private law issues was marked by an increasingly
market-oriented conservatism.334 Corporate law scholarship fell directly into line with
such trends.335 This is because academics embracing the nexus of contracts concept
tended to presume that, as compared with government regulators, business
participants typically do a better job of structuring transactions and addressing
potentially contentious issues.336
Another aspect of Sunstein’s analysis of academic fads which is potentially
pertinent for corporate law scholarship involves the presence of strongly-held views in
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an academic environment. Sunstein describes the emergence and durability of fads in
terms of reputational pressures and “group polarization”, where a like-minded group
moves collectively via mutual self-reinforcement towards an extreme position.337 The
skepticism towards dissent implied by this characterization of academic thought has
arguably been evident in the area of corporate law. For instance, when the separation
of ownership and control thesis was the intellectual point of departure, most legal
academics reacted with “cold disdain” to Manne’s critique of the managerialist thesis
of the public corporation.338 Moving to the present, as we have seen, in the U.S.
corporate law scholarship allegedly cannot succeed in the marketplace of ideas unless
an economics of law perspective has been adopted.339
Assume, for the sake of argument, that there can be fads in the corporate law
literature. This still leaves open a key point concerning Sunstein’s analysis of legal
scholarship. Again, he is something of a “cascade pessimist” because he believes that
bad ideas can potentially prosper for a long period of time.340 In other words,
durability is not a reliable signal of quality. More broadly, it cannot be taken for
granted that ideas which become dominant within a discipline represent “progress” in
any meaningful sense. Instead, they may simply be the product of a bandwagon effect
built upon a “wrong” outcome. Applying this insight to the contemporary analysis of
corporate law, the inference one can draw is that the economic approach which has
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predominated in the literature for the past two decades (at least in the U.S.) has not
done so because of the inherent merits of this mode of analysis.
Is cascade pessimism appropriate in this instance? Perhaps not. The views
expressed by critics of economic analysis are potentially revealing. When the nexus
of contracts model was novel, skeptics acknowledged that it was fashionable but said
it was destined to fade away quickly. For instance, one U.S. law professor proclaimed
in 1988 that “the original contract paradigm had outlived its usefulness”341 and
another subsequently said its advocates should “retool” and become “teachers of
family law, or land use, or take up golf or serious gardening”.342 Moreover, this was
the fate that was deserved since the economic approach to corporate law was flawed.
As Melvin Eisenberg, a prominent critic, declared in 1990, “(t)he brute fact is that
contractarian theory can have no meaningful application to an institution, like the
publicly held corporation, that is essentially non-contractual in orientation”.343
Now the tone of debate has changed, at least in the U.S. Increasingly, the
nexus of contracts model has been accepted as a pivotal analytical construct. Indeed,
as mentioned, those with misgivings tend to use it as a point of departure rather than
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seeking to dismiss it categorically.344 Melvin Eisenberg’s approach is illustrative.
Though he retained his skepticism of the contractarian approach, by 1999 he was
prepared to concede that the model was influential and captured at least a partial view
of reality.345 Since even critics of economic analysis have been prepared to concede
that it has made a helpful contribution, this may well not be an instance where a “bad”
idea has prospered for a long period of time.
In the area of corporate law, the fact that a durable theory such as the nexus of
contracts model seemingly has intellectual merit may not be a coincidence. Since the
arrival of new information can correct quite quickly an initially mistaken cascade, a
factor which likely influences the extent to which misguided academic fads persist is
the “open” or “closed” nature of the intellectual discourse.346 Correspondingly,
erroneous legal scholarship bandwagons should be more vulnerable to displacement
when practicing lawyers and judges engage with the literature than when the relevant
field is specialized, insulated and purely academic. Richard Posner, as we have seen,
has made this point by contrasting interdisciplinary legal scholarship dealing with
moral philosophy (a closed network) and bankruptcy law (an open network).347
Assuming that the “open” or “closed” nature of discourse does influence the
longevity of a mistaken fad, corporate law is a field where cascade optimism is
appropriate. This is because, as with bankruptcy law, the intellectual network is
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outward looking, with there being an audience for theoretical corporate law
scholarship outside law faculties.348 For example, in the United States allegedly
“judicial opinions and practitioner publications are filled with the jargon of law and
economics”.349 Also, Thomas Ulen, an expert on the economic analysis of law, has
said about the corporate field that he is “not aware of any other area of the law where
the connection between innovations in legal scholarship and the work of practitioners,
judges and policy-makers has been quite so clear”.350 Even in the United Kingdom,
where economic analysis has not had a substantial influence on corporate law
scholarship,351 during the late 1990s the English and Scottish Law Commissions
secured a contribution from law and economics experts as part of a review of the
duties of company directors.352
The “open” nature of the intellectual discourse on corporate law is not a
coincidence. Instead, academics in the field -- including those who adopt an
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interdisciplinary approach -- are keen to engage issues of practical interest.353 As
Deborah DeMott has said, “the recent literature (on corporate law) eagerly embraces
as topics for study all manner of current developments in business and financial
practice”.354 Assuming that “open” and “closed” discourse yield different outcomes
with respect to academic fads, the strong link between practice and theory in the
corporate law field suggests that “cascade optimism” is appropriate. DeMott
essentially concurs with this verdict, saying that the fact “current practice intrigues
theoretically-oriented academics helps ensure that corporate law scholarship will not
run dry”.355
IV.

CONCLUSION

In recent decades, there has been an explosion in legal scholarship marked by
the proliferation of new law reviews and the growing use of interdisciplinary
analysis.356 Still, there has been little systematic analysis of the manner in which
academic writing on law evolves over time. This paper’s purpose has been to address
this gap and offer insights concerning the development of legal scholarship. The first
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step was to identify five potential trajectories. Part II’s overview of the field indicates
that all are plausible to at least some degree. At the same time, no single account is
fully convincing.357 Moreover, the various options yield lessons that are, at least in
some measure, contradictory.358
To address such paradoxes and to shed light on the manner in which academic
writing on law evolves, part III of the paper presented a case study of corporate law.
The analysis offered confirms that each of the trajectories identified in part II can be
relied upon to explain the evolution of corporate law scholarship. For instance, Berle
and Means’ pioneering work on the separation of ownership and control was at least
partially scientific in its approach and the use of event studies helps to ensure that
formal verification of hypotheses is a component of the contemporary theoretical
literature. With Kuhn’s work, characterizing corporate law scholarship in terms of
paradigms, normal science and so on has proved to be a popular endeavor. The
marketplace for ideas may have had a beneficial impact on the literature since
academic writing on corporate law has arguably become “better”, particularly in the
past two or three decades. At the same time, the presence of enduring questions has
meant the literature has a cyclical aspect. Finally, external shocks, reputational
constraints and perhaps even “group polarization” have had an influence on corporate
law scholarship, which implies that trends in the literature resemble fads or fashions.
In addition to illustrating that each of the trajectories outlined in part II offers
insights concerning the evolution of legal scholarship, the case study in part III
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affirmed that each has its limitations. For example, much of the academic literature
on corporate law is too normative in orientation to qualify as scientific enquiry.
Kuhn’s analytical framework may not be directly relevant because the field has
arguably lacked the sort of tight research consensus required for concepts such as
“paradigms” and “normal science” to be relevant. The hallmarks of “market failure”
that afflict legal scholarship generally are pertinent with respect to corporate law,
which implies that it cannot be taken for granted that the forces of supply and demand
will yield “progress”. Since the “future contours of corporate legal theory are
imponderable”,359 a cyclical account of academic writing on the topic must
necessarily be incomplete to some degree. Finally, while applying terminology such
as “fads” and “fashions” to academic concepts might imply superficiality, the “open”
nature of corporate law discourse suggests theoretical approaches which become
popular and endure are likely to have some form of intrinsic merit.
A potential objection to the inferences drawn from the case study of corporate
law is that the sample was not representative. To the extent that this is true,
trajectories that seem to be a good “fit” with corporate law may be irrelevant with
respect to other areas. To illustrate, while the profound influence which law and
economics has had on corporate law scholarship means that a credible argument can
be made that scientifically-oriented progress has been made in the field, there will be
areas of the law where the situation will be different. For instance, empirical
methodology, with an attendant emphasis on verification and falsification, has
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apparently had little impact on constitutional or family law.360 In fields such as these,
the trajectory of scholarship may entirely lack a scientific angle.
It is unrealistic to expect that legal scholarship would develop at the same pace
in all fields. Instead, there will inevitably be some unevenness in the overall
development and maturity of particular areas.361 Correspondingly, it should not be
surprising that there are fields with trajectories somewhat different from corporate
law. This possibility does not necessarily undermine the value of the case study
offered here, since it is unlikely that the academic writing associated with any
particular area of the law could be perfectly representative of legal scholarship at
large. There would, however, be a serious problem if corporate law was profoundly
out-of-step with general trends. To take one example, tax would have been a
problematic choice for a case study since the relevant literature is allegedly
significantly behind the curve within the legal academy.362
With respect to corporate law, there admittedly has traditionally been
something of a tendency within the legal academy to treat it as a lesser subject.363
Indeed, until two or three decades ago, academics in the field were essentially
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concurring with this gloomy assessment.364 Still, as we have seen, the subject has
benefited from something of an intellectual renaissance in the period since.365 This, in
turn, likely means that corporate law is in fact no longer seriously behind the curve.366
Correspondingly, the case study offered in part III likely does constitute a fair test of
the trajectories outlined in part II and correspondingly lends legitimate support to the
proposition that each is a plausible driver, albeit within limits.
For those seeking decisive answers concerning the trajectory of legal
scholarship, the tentative nature of the conclusions offered here might be somewhat
disappointing. A clear-cut outcome was not, however, really a serious prospect.
After all, there is “no jurisprudence of legal scholarship” and drawing firm
conclusions without additional evidence concerning particular subject areas would
have been imprudent. Given these caveats, the appropriate way to interpret the
findings offered here is as a first step in a larger intellectual enquiry. A series of
plausible trajectories for legal scholarship has been identified and explained.
Moreover, the case study of corporate law has confirmed that, to varying degrees,
each is credible. Correspondingly, for those who are interested in why ideas spread
and prosper whereas other claims “burn out”, this paper offers a “test-driven”
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analytical framework that can be applied to discern how legal scholarship evolves
over time.

